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A REPLY TO CRITICS OF  
IN DEFENSE OF KANT’S RELIGION1
Nathan A. Jacobs
In this essay, I reply to the above four critics of In Defense of Kant’s Religion 
(IDKR). In reply to George di Giovanni, I highlight the interpretive differ-
ences that divide the authors of IDKR and di Giovanni, and argue that di 
Giovanni’s atheist reading of Kant does not follow, even granting his prem-
ises. In reply to Pamela Sue Anderson, I show that if her reading of Kant is 
accurate, Kant’s own talk of God becomes empty and contemptible by his 
own lights, and I then show how her empirical bias prompts a significant 
misreading of IDKR. In reply to Stephen Palmquist, I expose four fallacious 
maneuvers in his paper, which comprise the bulk of his essay. And in reply to 
Michalson, I address a series of minor concerns raised in his essay, and then 
set the record straight on the motives behind IDKR in general and my own 
take on Kant’s compatibility (or lack thereof) with Christianity in specific.
1. Reply to George di Giovanni
I begin my reply to di Giovanni with two points of agreement. First, di 
Giovanni asserts that Kant’s argument is coherent. Kant is wrong, but 
coherently wrong (164). One way of putting the task of IDKR is that it 
argues the validity of Kant’s argument; it leaves unanswered whether 
his argument is sound. I will discuss my take on Kant toward the close 
of this essay, but for now suffice it to say that I agree with di Giovanni. I 
take Kant’s argument to be valid, not sound. This is noteworthy because, 
as Part 1 of IDKR makes plain, there are many scholars who take the 
validity of Kant’s argument to be suspect. Nicholas Wolterstorff, Philip 
Quinn, and Gordon Michalson level serious charges against the coher-
ence of Religion within the Bounds of Mere Reason (IDKR, 46–57; and chap. 
3). No doubt di Giovanni and the authors of IDKR disagree about what 
Kant is saying, but to grant that Kant is coherently wrong is no small 
point of agreement.
My thanks to the Society of Christian Philosophers and Faith and Philosophy for deeming 
In Defense of Kant’s Religion (henceforth IDKR) worthy of both an authors-meet-critics ses-
sion at the American Academy of Religion and a symposium journal issue. In particular, I 
would like to thank Jamie Smith and Andrew Chignell for organizing the initial panel, and 
thank Chignell and Tom Flint for seeing this collection of essays through to publication. I 
would also like to extend my thanks to the critics of IDKR for their willingness to engage 
this work. I take their criticisms to be a great compliment.
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The second point of agreement comes in the opening of di Giovanni’s 
comment. He writes, “I am pessimistic about the possibility of initiating 
a genuine dialogue. My understanding of Kant’s critique of reason and 
the historical context in which I place that critique, are simply too far re-
moved from theirs” (163). I commend di Giovanni’s honesty and echo his 
sentiment. The divide between di Giovanni and the authors of IDKR goes 
well beyond Religion, so much so that to dialogue about the interpretive 
specifics of Religion runs the risk of our speaking past one another. But, as 
di Giovanni says, one can at least try.
The most basic divide between di Giovanni and the authors of IDKR 
concerns where Kant marks the limits of rationality. Di Giovanni identi-
fies himself as a “Christian atheist” (165), and his paper leaves the impres-
sion that he would say the same (or something similar) about Kant. If I 
understand di Giovanni correctly, he takes Kant’s critique of reason to 
land us at knowledge of the empirically known, while reason’s transcen-
dental self-examination produces “rational myths” (167). In other words, 
given the needs of reason, it invents chimeras to address its own instabili-
ties; yet these myths are empty concepts that are “practical” only in the 
sense that they serve a stabilizing function. The transcendental boundary 
line is not, then, an epistemic line but an ontic one, dividing that which 
is (the empirically known) from that which is not (that for which there 
is no possible intuition). The implication is that God, freedom, immor-
tality, and the soul are non-entities invented by reason to address its 
own impotence.
Such a take on Kant’s philosophy stands in stark contrast to that of the 
authors of IDKR. We take the transcendental boundary line to divide the 
empirically knowable from the empirically unknowable. But we do not 
presume that empirical unknowability indicates non-existence. Rather, 
the limits of empirical knowledge press reason into practical, aesthetic, 
and teleological considerations, and these considerations commend God, 
freedom, immortality and the soul, neither as objects of knowledge nor as 
myths, but as rational beliefs (IDKR, 112).
The divide between di Giovanni’s understanding of Kant and ours is 
significant. Yet, this divide goes well beyond IDKR; it represents a divide 
between two camps of Kant interpretation. The case is made in Kant and 
the New Philosophy of Religion that there are two interpretive trends in Kant 
studies, which the editors dub “traditional interpretations” and “affirma-
tive interpretations.” Interpretations designated “traditional” are negative 
toward the prospects of grounding religion and theology in the Kantian 
paradigm, while interpreters designated “affirmative” believe a proper 
reading of Kant offers some form of theological affirmation.2 Di Giovanni 
is a traditional interpreter, while the authors of IDKR are affirmative 
2See Chris L. Firestone and Stephen R. Palmquist, “Editors’ Introduction,” in Kant and 
the New Philosophy of Religion, ed. Firestone and Palmquist (Bloomington, IN: Indiana Uni-
versity Press, 2006).
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interpreters. Acknowledging this divide, I will highlight three flaws that 
I see in di Giovanni’s approach to Kant.
Assuming di Giovanni would label Kant an atheist, the first difficulty 
this label creates is that it ignores Kant’s insistence that his strictures on 
knowledge cut two ways, silencing both the dogmatist and the skeptic 
(A388–389).3 As a theologian, I am often reminded of the implications for 
my discipline, so allow me to return the favor. Under Kant’s strictures, 
atheism is a form of dogmatism. It asserts a knowledge claim (albeit a neg-
ative one) regarding God that violates Kant’s limits on human knowledge.4
Since we are here focused on Kant’s Religion, I will cite Book 4 on this 
point. There Kant identifies the position of the naturalist as out of bounds 
for the rationalist: “Hence [the rationalist] will never deny in the manner 
of a naturalist . . . the intrinsic possibility of revelation” (6:155). Were Kant 
a naturalist (as opposed to a rationalist) and thus certain that God does 
not exist, rejecting the possibility of revelation would not only be rational 
but necessary. For there would exist no being worthy of the name God 
that may reveal himself. Yet, it is Kant’s epistemic strictures that stave off 
dogmatic atheism and demand that the door remain ever-open to the pos-
sibility that God exists and may reveal himself.5
For the purposes of Kant interpretation, Kant’s insistence on our epis-
temic limits is essential, since the limits of knowledge serve a positive 
function: they force us to seek non-empirical grounds by which we may 
consider questions of God, freedom, and immortality. When reason com-
mends belief in God, it does not do so in the manner of the theological 
non-realist who is certain that such talk is useful but empty.6 Reason com-
mends belief as rational because it cannot discount the possibility that 
these concepts, commended by reason’s transcendental self-examination, 
may be rooted in reality.
This brings me to a second feature of di Giovanni’s comment, which is 
susceptible to the charge of begging the question. Di Giovanni’s presenta-
tion presumes that if a reading of Kant is theologically or metaphysically 
robust, then it is wrong. Di Giovanni is certainly within his intellectual 
rights to presume such a reading of Kant. However, to presume this read-
ing and its entailments in the current context begs the question at hand, 
3Throughout this essay, citations of Kant’s writings are embedded in the body of the 
essay and refer to the German Akademie pagination. English quotations are based on the 
Cambridge University Press translations of Kant’s works. 
4I develop this line of argument in “Kant’s Apologia: A Look at the Usefulness of Kantian 
Insights for Christian Thought,” Philosophia Christi 9:1 (2007).
5See Chris L. Firestone, “The Illegitimate Son: Kant and Theological Non-Realism,” in 
The Persistence of the Sacred in Modern Thought, ed. Chris L. Firestone and Nathan A. Jacobs 
(Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2012), chap. 10.
6E.g., Don Cupitt, Nothing Sacred? The Non-Realist Philosophy of Religion (New York: Ford-
ham University Press, 2002); Don Cupitt, “God and the World in Post-Kantian Thought,” 
Theology 75 (1972); Don Cupitt, The Nature of Man (London: Sheldon Press, 1979); and Don 
Cupitt, “Kant and the Negative Theology,” in The Philosophical Frontiers of Christian Theology, 
ed. B. Hebblethwaite and S. Sutherland (Cambridge University Press, 1982).
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namely, whether Kant’s rational religion is in fact metaphysically robust. 
The authors of IDKR maintain that the matter must be adjudicated by 
Kant’s texts, and the textual finding of IDKR is that Religion is a meta-
physically and theologically robust text.
I will highlight one example from Book 4. In 6:153–155, Kant identi-
fies various positions on revelation. In IDKR, we give both textual and 
contextual reason to think that Kant’s assessment of the matter is as fol-
lows. Concerning revelation, one may reject its very possibility and be a 
naturalist or accept its possibility and be a rationalist. The question facing 
the rationalist is whether revelation is a possible but unnecessary hasten-
ing influence on reason or is a catalyst necessary to awaken reason. The 
former position is that of the pure rationalist; the latter is that of the super-
naturalist rationalist. These positions correspond to those identified by 
G. E. Lessing in §§4 and 77 of The Education of the Human Race,7 and their 
influence is noted by historians, such as August Dorner and Emmanuel 
Hirsch (IDKR, 211–220).8 The fact that Kant narrows his discussion to 
these two positions is significant. For though he does not solve the debate, 
he does place himself within a discussion of philosophical theology very 
unlike what would be expected from the traditional Kant.
The third point is this. Even if we grant di Giovanni’s reading of Kant, 
the atheist conclusion does not follow. For the inference moves from a de 
jure criticism (concerning how the belief emerges) to a de facto conclusion 
(concerning the truth or falsehood of the belief). The inference is a genetic 
(or, given the turn to the subject, psychogenetic) fallacy.
Alvin Plantinga makes a similar point in reference to Sigmund Freud’s 
charge that religious belief is the product of wish fulfillment. Plantinga 
points out that Freud’s claim is a de jure criticism. Building on his own 
work concerning warranted belief, Plantinga argues that the question of 
whether this de jure criticism yields the de facto implication that religious 
belief is false depends on (a) whether Freud’s claim concerning wish ful-
fillment is true and (b) whether this wish fulfillment constitutes a faculty 
aimed at something other than truth.9 Concerning (b), Plantinga points 
out that one could argue that when considering which possible means 
is most efficient for producing belief in God, God concluded that wish 
fulfillment is that most efficient means. If this were the de facto origin 
of wish fulfillment, then wish fulfillment would be a faculty aimed at 
7The Education of the Human Race can be found (in German) in Sämtliche Schriften und 
Briefe, ed. Der Deutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin (Berlin, 1923–), vol. 13, 
413–436 and (in English) in Lessing’s Theological Writings, trans. Henry Chadwick (Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 1957).
8See also I. A. Dorner, History of Protestant Theology, Particularly in Germany, Viewed Ac-
cording to Its Fundamental Movement and Connection with the Religious, Moral, and Intellectual 
Life (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1871), vol. 2, bk. 2, div. 2, pt. 3, ch. 1ff.; and Emanuel Hirsch, Ge-
schichte der Neuern Evangelischen Theologie. Im Zusammenhang mit den allgemeinen Bewegungen 
des europãischen Denkens (C. Bertelsmann Verlag Gutersloh, 1949), vol. 1, pt. 1, chaps. 47–48.
9See Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2000), 194–195. 
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truth, and the de jure criticism would be no criticism at all. Merely naming 
the faculty “wish fulfillment” does not show the falsehood of the beliefs 
it generates.
The same reply could be offered to di Giovanni’s Kant. Even if we grant 
that God, freedom, etc., are mere inventions of reason to stabilize itself (a 
point the authors of IDKR deny), this concession would not demonstrate 
the de facto falsehood of such beliefs. It may well be that God has created 
reason with all its limits and instabilities precisely because these are the 
most efficient conditions for generating concepts of and beliefs in God, 
freedom, immortality, and the soul. It may well be that all of these inven-
tions of reason have referents in reality (empirically inaccessible) to which 
these beliefs correspond. Simply naming them “rational myths” does not 
indicate their falsehood.
I close this reply to di Giovanni with a comment on the passage he 
cites from the third Critique (5:402). First, I would note that di Giovanni’s 
take on the import of this passage is flawed on logical grounds. In the 
passage Kant highlights the failing of the understanding to show any 
connection between possibility (concepts) and actuality (intuitions). From 
this di Giovanni concludes that modal categories do not apply to things 
in themselves (168). But failing to prove q is different from disproving q.
Aside from this quibble, however, I take issue with di Giovanni’s un-
derstanding of the subject of the passage. Di Giovanni reads the passage 
as a remark on modality and concludes that the understanding’s inabil-
ity to bridge the gap between possibility and actuality means that Kant 
cuts off possibility, accepting only actuality (168). In its broader context, 
however, this passage is not about modality. Prior to this remark, Kant 
discusses the need of reason to posit an intelligence (God) as the source of 
teleology. In the remarks, he goes on to discuss an important distinction 
between reason and understanding. The entire discussion of possibility 
and actuality is in the context of a problem that understanding (not rea-
son) runs into, given its dealings with the empirical. Understanding deals 
in either intuitions, which are present to the senses, or concepts unem-
ployed. The former concerns actual things (things known to have being 
because they are present to the senses), while the latter considers only the 
internal coherence of objects of thought. When limited to the understand-
ing, we run aground in thinking of anything beyond mere possibility and 
mere actuality, and have no basis on which to bridge the two—the point 
on which di Giovanni harps. But Kant’s opening distinction between rea-
son and understanding is pivotal and goes to the heart of our distinc-
tion in IDKR between pure cognitions of reason and empirical cognitions. 
Cognitions of reason are not mere mental pictures. Cognitions of reason 
deal in the a priori understanding of God as the ens realissimum for which 
there is no possible intuition (A575–78/B603–606, A621/B649, 28:1020; 
IDKR, 104–105). Reason is here purged of its tendency to embellish God 
with anthropomorphisms, and instead deals in practical, aesthetic, and 
teleological considerations that are derived from reason’s transcendental 
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self-examination. Understanding has difficulty with such cognitions be-
cause it seeks to either force them into the realm of the actual (empirical 
intuition) or relegate them to the possible (unemployed concepts). But this 
is a problem for the faculty of understanding, not for the faculty of reason.
2. Reply to Pamela Sue Anderson
The distinction between reason and understanding brings me to Ander-
son’s paper, which proves just as befuddled by pure cognitions of reason 
as the faculty of understanding. Anderson cannot find where to place 
cognitions of reason, since she is dealing in only empirical intuitions and 
concepts unemployed. If God or other rational concepts, such as those 
discussed in IDKR, are in mind, Anderson concludes that they must be 
an empirical intuition, a concept unemployed, or some via media that 
moves from the latter to the former—what she calls “coming to know” 
(152, 155). Firestone has given ample attention to Anderson, so I will sim-
ply add two points.
The first is this. If we limit Kant’s philosophical inquiries to only con-
cepts and intuitions, then Kant’s own concept of God becomes empty, if 
not contemptible by his own lights. To explain, Kant is quite clear that the 
a priori understanding of God is different from anthropomorphic ideas of 
God, which find their footing in the empirical. As Kant states,
For if in some other, perhaps practical relations, the presupposition of a 
highest and all-sufficient being, as supreme intelligence, were to assert its 
validity without any objection, then it would be of the greatest importance 
to determine this concept precisely on its transcendental side, as the concept 
of a necessary and most-real being, to get rid of what is incompatible with 
the highest reality, what belongs to mere appearance (anthropomorphism 
broadly understood), and at the same time to get out of the way all opposed 
assertions, whether they be atheistic, deistic or anthropomorphic; all this 
is very easy to do in such a critical treatment, since the same grounds of 
considering human reason incapable of asserting the existence of such a 
being, when laid before our eyes, also suffice to prove the unsuitability of 
all counter-assertions. (A640–641/B668–B669)
Kant is explicit that if the presupposition of a highest and all-sufficient 
being (the a priori concept of God) is to assert its validity, then it must be 
purged of empirical elements. But we must ask: If Kant cannot have anything 
in mind but the empirical, how can any concept survive the disposal of all empiri-
cal elements?
The same question emerges in Kant’s articulation of the problem of 
divine revelation. According to Kant, the idea of God is such that only an 
infinite experience would be adequate to the concept (A621/B649). Yet, be-
cause Kant thinks such an experience is impossible, he presumes that any 
finite appearance must always be judged to be something other than God. 
For no matter how grand the empirical intuition, as finite it is at odds with 
the a priori concept of a being having all reality (7:63, 8:142–143, 28:1022, 
28:1118). Once again, however, we must ask: If all concepts are empirically 
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derived, what is the alternative to anthropomorphic concepts of God? With what 
does Kant think we are to compare an empirical appearance?
Kant’s insistence that we purge our concept of God of all empirical 
elements implies that a non-anthropomorphic concept of God is possible. 
Kant speaks of God and thus has a concept of him. But if all concepts 
find their footing in the empirical, as Anderson seems to think, then even 
Kant’s concept of God is corrupt by his own standards.
The authors of IDKR, arrive at a different conclusion. We take Kant’s 
continual distinction between a priori and anthropomorphic views of God 
to indicate that a non-anthropomorphic concept of God is possible. This 
brings us once again to the distinction made in IDKR between pure and 
empirical cognition. Our claim is simply that, for Kant, not all that one 
gets in mind is grounded in empirical intuition. Hence, Kant can get God 
in mind without anthropomorphism, and it is this type of pure cogni-
tion that is in play when Kant speaks of God as the “being of all beings” 
(A578/B606), “a being having all reality” (631/B659), and so on. This a priori 
concept is the object of rational belief and is in view amid Kant’s transcen-
dental arguments, including those in Religion (IDKR, 105–119, 155–170, 
202–205).
This brings me to my second point concerning how Anderson’s empiri-
cal bias prompts a severe misreading of IDKR. Anderson characterizes 
the role of pure cognition in IDKR as “meant to stress the process of com-
ing to know” (153). I am not clear on what Anderson has in mind here, 
but my impression is that she reads us as beginning with rational con-
cepts and moving toward, or arriving at, an empirical intuition (152–153, 
156–157). Hence she argues that our take on transcendental claims seems 
un-Kantian because they depend on the “intellectual intuition of a pro-
totype, i.e., Christ as God and man” (160). But the authors of IDKR make 
no such claim. The only place in IDKR in which we speak of “coming to 
know” is in reference to an article by Rolf George in which he notes that 
though erkennen can mean “to come to know,” it can also have a more 
general meaning of getting something in mind (IDKR, 110). As we go on 
to explain, our use of “pure cognition” (e.g., in reference to the prototype) 
refers to the latter use, not to empirical knowledge (IDKR, 110–114). As 
noted above in reference to di Giovanni, we do not take the concepts at 
which reason arrives by its transcendental self-examination to be mere 
chimeras. However, as argued above in reference to Anderson, not all ra-
tional concepts are possible objects of experience. Instead, IDKR contends 
that the moral disposition and the prototype are pure cognitions (or non-
empirical rational concepts) that are gotten in mind and for which there 
are critically satisfying moral and religious support for their affirmation 
as rational beliefs. They are not, however, known (in the Kantian sense), 
nor do we come to know them.
As for Anderson’s charge that “Firestone and Jacobs seem to assume 
that pure cognition of what is empirically unknowable is rendered possi-
ble by Christ as ‘the prototype’ of the pure moral disposition” (12), this too 
REPLY TO CRITICS OF IN DEFENSE OF KANT’S RELIGION 217
is false. Such a characterization is much closer to Jeffrey Privette who em-
ploys Henry Allison’s double-aspect reading and Palmquist’s principle of 
perspective to claim that Christ is the empirical side of the transcendent 
God.10 This position I wrote against prior to IDKR,11 and IDKR too rejects 
it. For example, “The prototype is not a translation of Christian theology 
or a symbolic rendition of Jesus of Nazareth” (IDKR, 154, also 117, 155).
IDKR states explicitly that neither the moral disposition nor the pro-
totype is a possible object of experience (IDKR, 142, 158). The prototype, 
on our reading, is a concept of reason. We argue that Kant’s prototype is 
an archetypal Idea (in the Platonic sense) of morally perfect humanity. 
This prototype proceeds from God from eternity, much like the Kabbalist 
concept of Adam Kadmon (IDKR, 155–170).12 As for the relationship (or 
potential relationship) between the prototype and Jesus, we address this 
issue in our treatment of Book 3. There we make clear that, for Kant, it is 
possible that Jesus is an appearance of the prototype, but we could never 
know this to be so. The prototype is defined by his perfect disposition, and 
the disposition is not a possible object of experience. One could believe 
that Jesus is the prototype, but Kant would insist that such faith, to remain 
rational, be committed first to the prototype of reason and then to Jesus 
who is thought to be the prototype. For moral hope resides in the former; 
the latter, for Kant, offers hope only if he is indeed the prototype—some-
thing of which Kant believes we cannot be certain (IDKR, 203–204).
In the end, Anderson’s empirical bias hinders her from grasping what 
is meant by pure cognitions of reason and its role in IDKR’s interpretation 
of Religion. The result is a faulty understanding of what is being claimed 
about the status of rational beliefs, and about the relationship between 
these beliefs and historical faith.
3. Reply to Stephen Palmquist
I have chosen to focus on four significant fallacious maneuvers in 
Palmquist’s piece. To my mind, these comprise the bulk of his essay.13
10See Jeffrey S. Privette, “Must Theology Re-Kant?,” Heythrop Journal 40 (1999). 
11See Nathan Jacobs, “Kant’s Prototypical Theology: Transcendental Incarnation as a 
Rational Foundation for God-Talk,” in Firestone and Palmquist, Kant and the New Philosophy 
of Religion.
12I gather that one source of Anderson’s confusion is my/our talk of “transcendental 
incarnation,” a term Anderson must be reading as the transcendent becoming enfleshed 
(see her footnote 24). However, as I explain in my work prior to IDKR, and as we repeat in 
IDKR, “transcendental incarnation” does not refer to the prototype becoming empirical 
(see Jacobs, “Kant’s Prototypical Theology,” 134; and IDKR, 164). It refers to this supersen-
sible entity uniting himself with our secondary substance, human, thus making his moral 
disposition available to us; yet this descent or union is transcendental because it is a non-
empirical concept commended by the needs of reason (IDKR, 164).
13I have catalogued many more fallacious claims in Palmquist’s essay than I have space 
to itemize. E.g., under Errors of Fact, I have excluded five less-vital instances: (i) The au-
thors consider no “Axinn-type” affirmative approaches (172). Ad contra: we address the reading 
of Adina Davidovich, which fits the affirmative genre of an Axinn-type approach (IDKR, 
62–69). (ii) The authors claim that all other interpreters truncate the Religion text (174). Ad con-
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3.1 Errors of Fact
The most common feature of Palmquist’s paper is the Error of Fact. The 
first of these has already been noted by Firestone and comprises the en-
tirety of Palmquist’s first question, namely, that the authors of IDKR claim 
that their reading of Religion is unique because it is holistic and linear 
(171–174). The word linear appears only once in IDKR, and it is not there 
identified as a uniqueness (IDKR, 233). To the contrary, our treatment of 
the secondary literature in Part 1 presents alternative readings in as linear 
a manner as possible. The uniqueness of our position consists in (a) some 
of our preliminary considerations, (b) key features of our interpretation 
that emerge in response to the conundrums, and (c) the ability of our read 
to answer the conundrums.
The next three Errors of Fact all center on IDKR’s treatment of the two 
experiments. They are: (i) the authors do not consider alternatives to their read-
ing of the two experiments, (ii) the authors provide no rationale for their reading 
of the two experiments, and (iii) the authors do not address Kant’s use of scripture 
as potential counter-evidence to their reading of the two experiments (175–176). 
To (i), we do consider the reading of Hare and Reardon, which presumes 
that the first experiment consists of Groundwork and the second Critique 
(IDKR, 69–82, 114–119). This read has a commonsense appeal to it, since 
these works present Kant’s moral philosophy, and as we show in IDKR, 
this reading is able to handle a number of conundrums (IDKR, 73–82).
However, coming to Error of Fact (ii), we note several reasons for pre-
ferring our reading of the two experiments over the reading of Hare and 
Reardon. First, Kant indicates in Book 4 that he is now turning to New 
Testament (NT) Christianity, and is going to test it to see what in it falls to 
the realm of reason. This talk of turning to NT Christianity indicates that 
he has not previously done so in the manner of Book 4, and the nature 
of this turn fits what he describes in the Second Preface of Religion as his 
second experiment. Second, Kant’s terminology for the Christ figure of 
Religion shifts in Book 4. In Books 2 and 3, Kant consistently refers to the 
tra: we do not claim that all other interpreters truncate the Religion text, only that we do 
not do so when defending its coherence (IDKR, 234). (iii) The authors accuse others of making 
the text appear more persuasive than it actually is (178). Ad contra: I know of no place in IDKR 
in which we claim that other Kant interpreters are guilty of making the text appear more 
persuasive than it actually is. (iv) The authors take Kant’s “metaphorical pruning” to apply only 
to Christianity, not to any other historical faith (176). Ad contra: we make quite clear that Kant’s 
“metaphorical pruning” could be applied to any historical faith, even though Kant chooses 
to make focus on NT Christianity in Religion (IDKR, 197–201). (v) We portray Palmquist as ad-
vocating mystical irrationality (see his footnote 8). Ad contra: we distinguish the Critical Mys-
ticism discussed by Palmquist from the uncritical mysticism of Swedenborg (IDKR, 21–24). 
I have excluded instances of Begging the Question. E.g., Palmquist presents our conclusion 
that Kant’s prototype is Platonic rather than Christian as a strike against us (179), which 
begs the question of whether we are correct. I have also excluded an instance of Internal 
Contradiction. To wit: Palmquist at one moment attacks IDKR’s reading of the two experi-
ments because the relationship between rational religion and historical faith, addressed in 
Book 3, belongs to the second experiment (contra IDKR) (176); and later Palmquist argues 
that the relationship between rational religion and historical faith, addressed in Book 4, 
belongs to the first experiment (contra IDKR) (177).
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prototype, while in Book 4 he refers to Jesus as the Teacher of the Gospel. This 
sharp distinction gives reason to think that Kant’s talk of the prototype 
in Books 2 and 3 is different from his discussion of Jesus in Book 4. Third, 
Kant is clear that rational faith in the prototype is distinct from historical 
faith in a particular historical figure. In this light, any reading that con-
flates his discussion of the prototype in Books 2 and 3 with a discussion 
of Jesus is misguided. Kant’s turn to the Teacher of the Gospel in Book 
4 should therefore be read as distinct from his prior discussion (IDKR, 
114–119).
To Error of Fact (iii), we address Kant’s use of scripture directly prior to 
moving into our reading. I will simply quote the key passage on the point:
Three points should be kept in mind. . . . First and foremost, Kant is explicit 
in the claim that the philosophical faculty is free to draw on any resources 
it likes, even the Bible, in its critical evaluation of reason, but such drawing 
does not mean that the use is dependent upon these resources. . . . Second, 
Kant also gives indication in the First Preface of Religion that he intends 
Religion to be (at least partly) in dialogue with theologians. . . . A third point 
to consider is that we find in Book Four of Religion Kant’s affirmation of the 
claim that revelation, which cannot be viewed as impossible, could present 
itself as a catalyst for awakening truths already embedded in reason. . . . 
Such statements indicate that Kant is not adverse to the idea that an insight 
(a rational insight) may be awoken by engagement with a purported revela-
tion. (IDKR, 117–118)
These three Errors of Fact appear in the context of one claim that is true: 
we do not consider Palmquist’s reading of the two experiments (175–176). 
The reasons for this have already been noted by Firestone. In Palmquist’s 
published works, the main evidence for his reading is his broader system 
of Kant interpretation—a system we do not endorse. In addition, IDKR is a 
problem-driven project, and we did not find in Palmquist either acknowl-
edgement of or dealings with the conundrums in Kant’s Religion. As for 
the “massive” textual evidence Palmquist forwards in his paper, once one 
cuts through the fallacious claims catalogued therein, the case amounts 
to an observation that Kant quotes scripture prior to Book 4.14 As noted 
above, we address this point in IDKR, and I believe our exposition makes 
clear that what Kant is doing with Christianity in Book 4 is different from 
what he does in Books 1–3.
3.2. Direct Attacks
A second prominent maneuver invoked in Palmquist’s criticism is the 
Direct Attack in which he makes an unsupported assertion. The majority, 
though not the totality, of these appear in Palmquist’s attack on IDKR’s 
reading of the two experiments. The first three state in different ways that 
14A serious problem for Palmquist’s reading is that Kant quotes Scripture unpredictably 
throughout each book of Religion. If biblical quotations constitute evidence of the second 
experiment, I would conclude that Religion contains only the second experiment, as per the 
Hare/Reardon reading. 
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Book 4 adds something crucial to the first experiment. Palmquist asserts 
that Kant says something essential about the first experiment in Book 4, 
but he does not tell us what this something is (177). The closest he comes 
to defending the claim is another Direct Attack in which he asserts that 
the distinction between true and false service to God is a “crucial compo-
nent of Kant’s system of rational religion” (177). Is it? Palmquist does not 
defend the claim, and I do not know any reason to accept it. He only goes 
on to restate the point again, suggesting that answering the question of 
how one serves God in a Church is crucial to the first experiment (177). 
But again, the point is asserted, not defended.
The fourth instance of Direct Attack focuses once again on IDKR’s read-
ing of the two experiments, but takes aim at a different target than the 
above three instances. As mentioned, IDKR argues that Kant’s turn to NT 
Christianity to test it is one of several reasons to think the second experi-
ment begins in Book 4. Palmquist asserts that Kant’s word “test” (prüfen) 
carries a distinctive meaning that is irrelevant to the two experiments; the 
term for experiment (Versuch) used in the Second Preface does not appear 
in Book 4 (see footnote 12 of Palmquist’s essay). Yet, Palmquist does not 
say what the distinctive meaning of prüfen is or why it is irrelevant to the 
two experiments. Is it true that Versuch (experiment or trial) has a techni-
cal meaning wholly unrelated to prüfen (to test or examine)? It is not clear 
to me that the meaning of these terms are unrelated or that either is so 
technical that Kant is bound to invoke the given word and only that word 
when discussing the particular aspect of his project to which it refers.
There is a fifth instance of Direct Attack in Palmquist’s critique that 
does not focus on the two experiments. This instance aims at dismissing 
IDKR’s reading of Book 3. In our exposition thereof, we make the case 
that Kant understands the morally converted individual to be fine in iso-
lation, but easily corrupted when in community with other individuals 
who have not undergone a moral conversion; therefore moral converts 
must band together in moral community (IDKR, 185–192). Contra IDKR, 
Palmquist claims that converted individuals corrupt one another (179). 
But once again, Palmquist provides no evidence for this counter reading.
3.3. Arguments by Half Truth
I find two fairly significant instances of Argument by Half Truth in 
Palmquist’s paper, both of which center once again on IDKR’s under-
standing of the two experiments. The first is Palmquist’s claim, “IDKR 
repeatedly identifies the second experiment with the entire Fourth Piece, 
yet admits the turn to the second experiment actually occurs only after 
Kant makes this distinction in the introductory section” (178). It is cer-
tainly true that the authors of IDKR suggest that Books 1–3 contain the 
first experiment, while Book 4 contains the second experiment (e.g., IDKR, 
119). But I know of no place where we put so fine a point on it as to say 
that the entire Book 4 is the second experiment. We maintain that the first 
experiment resolves with Book 3, but we understand Kant to open Book 4 
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with a preliminary word on the relationship between reason and revela-
tion (IDKR, 211–220). I do not understand why this is problematic. Kant 
has just spoken about rational religion, and is about to scrutinize a sup-
posed revelation (Christianity) in light of rational religion. Prior to doing 
so, he addresses a dispute in his day concerning the precise relationship 
between reason and revelation (IDKR, 214–220). Given that he is turning 
from the one (reason) to the other (revelation), such a preliminary word 
seems appropriate. I see no reason to think that simply because Book 4 
contains the second experiment, the first word of the book must constitute 
the execution of that experiment. Kant cannot offer a preliminary word?
The second example of Argument by Half Truth concerns Palmquist’s 
claim:
In describing Kant’s account of the two experiments, they claim the first 
“considers only natural religion,” while the second relates natural religion 
to a specific revelation; yet Kant introduces “natural religion” only in the 
Fourth Piece, never mentioning it in the Prefaces. By assuming the first ex-
periment corresponds to what Kant later calls “natural religion,” they clev-
erly make their assumption appear self-evident: the Fourth Piece, being the 
only place where Religion discusses how natural religion as such relates to a 
purported revelation, must constitute the second experiment! (175)
The half truth here concerns the definition of natural religion. It is true 
that we take “natural religion” to mean a religion based on reason. As 
Kant states, “a religion can be natural . . . if it is so constituted that human 
beings could and ought to have arrived at it on their own through the mere 
use of their own reason” (6:155). We thus understand “natural religion” 
and the “pure religion of reason” (identified in the Second Preface) to refer 
to the same thing. But the falsehood is that this is clever. To the contrary, 
it is common. Allen Wood, for example, understands these terms in the 
same way.15 Palmquist’s resistance to this reading implies that he thinks 
“natural religion” and the “pure religion of reason” are distinct, which 
makes me wonder how he understands these terms. If there is something 
clever afoot here, it is the divorce of these terms, not their marriage.
3.4. Poisoning the Well
The last of Palmquist’s tactics I will address is the Poisoning of the Well. 
There are numerous instances of this throughout Palmquist’s paper, par-
ticularly in his portrayal of what the authors of IDKR are doing at various 
stages (e.g., we rationalize [176]; we are forced to downplay [177]; we systematically 
overlook [179]). However, I will focus on one much more serious example. 
Palmquist suggests in several places that IDKR advances a reading of Reli-
gion very similar to his own, but does not acknowledge it (173). We advance 
a view of atonement similar to Palmquist’s own, but do not acknowledge it 
(174). We take him out of context and then assert his true position (see his 
15See Allen W. Wood, “Kant’s Deism,” in Kant’s Philosophy of Religion Reconsidered, ed. 
Philip J. Rossi and Michael Wreen (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1991), 5.
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footnote 9). Kant’s Critical Religion directly influenced IDKR’s understanding 
of the first experiment, but we do not acknowledge it (174).
In reply, I would note some of the most central insights that set IDKR 
apart as unique. In IDKR, we suggest that the first of Kant’s two experi-
ments occupy Books 1–3, while the second experiment is in Book 4. We 
follow Kant’s arguments in Book 1 to the conclusion that humanity, in the 
sense of secondary substance, must possess freedom in at least one act, 
namely, the defining of its supreme moral maxim; and it is this monopsy-
chic fall that constitutes radical evil. We unearth indications in Book 2 
that Kant’s prototype is essentially a Platonic archetype in God. We show 
how Kant understands the prototype to provide hope by making his dis-
position available to corrupt humanity, and we expound how union with 
the prototype’s disposition in conversion puts away the guilt of our for-
mer disposition and unites us with a disposition pleasing to God. We ex-
pound the relationship between moral conversion and the need for moral 
community, discussed in Book 3. We exposit the peculiar weaknesses of 
corrupt humans and why an engagement with historical faith is required. 
Our exposition of Kant’s preliminary word in Book 4 sheds new light on 
precisely how Kant understands the relationship between the naturalist, 
rationalist, supernaturalist and pure rationalist. And our reading system-
atically expounds and seeks to put away all the conundrums noted in the 
secondary literature.
I know of no place in Palmquist’s writings in which any of the above 
features or insights, as expounded in IDKR, can be found. Quite the con-
trary, I understand us to hold vastly different positions on virtually every 
key point of interpretation of Religion.
4. Reply to Gordon Michalson
I begin my reply to Michalson by addressing four minor points: (a) his 
concern that IDKR bars “hostile” witnesses, (b) his fear that the court-
room metaphor of IDKR distorts the readings of Religion addressed, (c) his 
claim that his own work is not concerned with the argumentative specif-
ics of Religion, and (d) his misunderstanding of key interpretive moments 
in IDKR.
Michalson is concerned that IDKR bars hostile witnesses, such as 
Yirmiahu Yovel, from the courtroom (191). For Michalson, this sets off 
alarm bells. It would for me, too, if this meant that opposing voices were 
not allowed when looking at the specifics of Religion. Yet, in the context 
of IDKR, this is not what is meant by the phrase. Certainly Wolterstorff 
and Quinn are hostile in a certain sense. To wit: they are hostile to the 
coherence of Religion.16 Such witnesses we have not only invited into 
16We focus on the following works in IDKR: Nicholas Wolterstorff, “Conundrums in 
Kant’s Rational Religion,” in Rossi and Wreen, Kant’s Philosophy of Religion Reconsidered; 
Nicholas Wolterstorff, “Is It Possible and Desirable for Theologians to Recover from Kant?,” 
Modern Theology 14:1 (1998); Philip L. Quinn, “Christian Atonement and Kantian Justifica-
tion,” Faith and Philosophy 3:4 (1986); Philip L. Quinn, “Original Sin, Radical Evil and Moral 
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IDKR, but have given our unwavering attention (IDKR, 46–57). Those wit-
nesses barred (which actually amounts to one) are readers who are hostile 
to the idea that Religion has something substantial to say. To admit these 
witnesses amid such a project would simply be unproductive, since they 
have no interest in such a project. To be sure, dismissing these readers 
does not ensure the coherence of Religion, as Michalson claims. For all 
apparent conundrums internal to the text and interpretive options for-
warded in the literature are given ample hearing (IDKR, 46–57; chap. 3). 
The limited number of voices merely assures that time is not wasted on 
arguments external to Religion that do not advance our understanding of 
the text itself—the primary concern of IDKR.
A second issue is Michalson’s fear that the courtroom metaphor used 
in IDKR distorts the readings of Religion addressed. Michalson is right 
in noting that guiding metaphors can warp interpretations (184)—as can 
meta-narratives regarding Kant’s place in Western thought. But the court-
room metaphor in IDKR is simply a literary device meant to help readers 
navigate material that is detailed and difficult. Because our concern is the 
question of coherence—nothing more, nothing less—those who argue for 
the coherence of Religion are deemed “defenders”; those who argue for 
incoherence are dubbed “prosecutors.” Defenders and prosecutors are 
so named relative to the coherence issue, not relative to the question of 
Kant’s significance. Many whom we lump with the prosecution are, to our 
minds, devoted Kantians—certainly more so than the authors of IDKR. 
Michalson’s proclamation that he is a defender of Kant’s significance (183) 
is simply off topic. IDKR is not concerned with this. Regarding the ques-
tion at hand—coherence—I do not believe warping has taken place. For 
Michalson admits his position is that Religion displays wobbles (188), or in 
the words of Fallen Freedom, is “riddled with inconsistencies.”17
This brings us to a third issue, namely, whether Michalson’s interest 
in Western thought generally adequately glosses over the specifics of 
Religion. Michalson sees his work as showing Kant’s importance to con-
temporary thought (183). The authors of IDKR do not dispute this. We 
may not even dispute the nature of Kant’s impact. What we do dispute 
is (a) that the story of Western thought can be told accurately without ad-
dressing the textual specifics of its players, and (b) that focus on the story 
of Western thought provides license to run roughshod over Kant’s texts. 
For an important question is whether the theologically negative impact 
Kant has had on Western thought matches his actual views. In light of 
our exegesis in IDKR, we question whether the religiously negative per-
ception of Kant is accurate. Michalson may want to divert attention away 
from his treatment of the specifics of Religion by deferring to his broader 
Identity,” Faith and Philosophy 1:2 (1984); Philip L. Quinn, “Saving Faith from Kant’s Remark-
able Antinomy,” Faith and Philosophy 7:4 (1990).
17Gordon E. Michalson, Jr., Fallen Freedom: Kant on Radical Evil and Moral Regeneration 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 1–10.
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aims, but the fact remains that the plot of the story changes depending on 
whether the impact a thinker has had is true to his writings. In the end, 
Michalson cannot shield his exegesis by appeal to a broader interest.
Fourth, I think it is noteworthy that while Michalson’s essay does not 
address the specifics of IDKR, his rare references to its specifics display 
misunderstandings of key interpretive moments. For example, Michalson 
states, “In a creative move, they fold together the issue of moral conver-
sion and the themes of atonement and grace running through the authors’ 
depiction in the previous chapter of Jesus as the ‘prototype’ of a moral dis-
position totally pleasing to God” (186; see also 187). As discussed above, 
central to the argument of IDKR is the claim that Kant’s discussion of 
the prototype in Book 2 is not about Jesus. In fact, our entire reading of the 
prototype is placed in juxtaposition with readings, such as Michalson’s 
own, that make this conflation (IDKR, 155).18 This causes me to wonder 
if Michalson’s interest in the motive of IDKR has caused him to miss the 
argument of the book.
The aforementioned interest in the motive behind IDKR is what I will 
devote the remainder of this essay to addressing. According to Michalson, 
the exposition of primary and secondary literature in IDKR is elaborate 
scaffolding that obscures the more interesting aim of showing Kant to be 
compatible with Christianity. In this charge, there are really two claims: 
(a) IDKR’s treatment of primary and secondary literature is disingenu-
ous, offering cover for a more central agenda, and (b) the authors of IDKR 
think Kant and Christianity are compatible. I will deal with these issues 
separately, beginning with the former.
Michalson could not be more wrong in stating that the exposition of the 
secondary literature (Part 1) and the exposition of Kant’s Religion (Part 2) 
are mere scaffolding. IDKR unfolds under a very intentional methodology. 
In Part 1, we treat the status quaestionis regarding Religion. We do so using 
a courtroom metaphor that helps readers differentiate advocates of coher-
ence from opponents of coherence. The result is a tally of charges against 
the coherence of Religion, and an accounting of hermeneutic options in 
the literature. Part 2 exposits Religion in light of Part 1. We follow Kant’s 
arguments in a linear and expository manner until a conundrum (identi-
fied in Part 1) is confronted. Hermeneutic forks in the road are identified 
by drawing on existing readings (again, as per Part 1), while also noting 
options not yet tested. Each road is put in dialog with the conundrum at 
hand, and whichever road can best deal with the conundrum is taken. The 
entire project is driven by the twofold query: What are the hurdles to reading 
Kant’s Religion as coherent? Can these hurdles be overcome? The above meth-
od is employed consistently throughout IDKR with a view to answering 
this twofold query.
Now we come to the second feature of Michalson’s charge, namely, that 
the authors of IDKR think Kant and Christianity are compatible. I must 
18E.g., Michalson, Fallen Freedom, 109.
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thank Michalson for providing an opportunity for me to set the record 
straight on this. Though I am a theologian by trade, I set aside my theolo-
gian’s hat in IDKR to wear my historian of ideas hat. Allow me to put back 
on my theologian’s hat and speak transparently about my take on Kant’s 
philosophy of religion. I do not think Kant’s “rational religion” is compat-
ible with orthodox Christian thought.
Michalson drew on an isolated statement from page 5 of IDKR in 
which we note that, at points, Kant’s Religion begins to look remarkably 
Christian. This comment, taken out of context, could give the impression 
that there is a positive assessment of Kant’s value for Christian thought. 
However, in context, the remark is intended to state clearly that we are 
not interested in whether Kant’s philosophy is compatible with Christian 
thought, nor are we assessing the value of Kant’s philosophy of religion 
from a Christian perspective. The theological value of Kant is a question 
we do not explore in IDKR, and we are explicit about that fact (IDKR, 5–6). 
Our affirmation that aspects of his thought look remarkably Christian is 
simply an acknowledgment that, on our reading, Kant’s philosophy ad-
vocates universal moral corruption; Kant notes the need for an alterna-
tive disposition that he locates in a moral archetype who sounds like a 
Christ figure; and Kant identifies the value of a moral community not 
unlike a Church. Indeed, these elements look very Christian. But looks can 
be deceiving.
The more important remark regarding my own assessment of Kant’s 
value for Christian thought comes in the context of our exegesis of the 
prototypical theology. We state that Kant’s prototype is divine “in the 
sense that he exists within God from all eternity,” but not in the Nicene-
Chalcedonian sense (IDKR, 163). Speaking as a confessional Christian, I 
think this assessment is par for the course in Kant’s philosophy of reli-
gion. Assuming IDKR is correct, Kant’s conclusions are more theologi-
cally robust than typically thought and come much closer to the central 
claims of Christianity than is often granted, but Kant’s most theologically 
robust moments are still at some remove from orthodox Christianity, at 
best falling short of its confessional standards and at worst proving in-
compatible with these standards. I certainly find Kant’s arguments inter-
esting on several points. But on all major points at which Kant’s project 
overlaps with Christian doctrine—depravity (Book 1), Christology (Book 
2), and ecclesiology (Book 3)—I think his positions prove to be theologi-
cally inadequate and often heterodox.
Kant’s argument for radical evil (as expounded in IDKR) is interesting, 
but I am unconvinced that it works. Kant believes the predicate moral in-
dicates that human entails a freely chosen moral maxim concerning the 
moral law generally; hence it is an essential property of our secondary 
substance (human) that it (i.e., our common nature) freely chooses a moral 
disposition that is then innate in all particulars having that nature. Such a 
view has a striking similarity to the monopsychism Christian orthodoxy 
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has historically resisted.19 I, for one, side with the Patristic outlook that 
predicates such as good or evil are accidental properties in creatures.20 While 
I concede that it is essential to the very idea human that we have moral facul-
ties, I do not concede Kant’s claim that being a moral species entails mono-
psychism. The inference from the predicate moral to moral maxim regarding 
the moral law in general presumes Kant’s moral philosophy (IDKR, 127–151). 
If one is in lockstep with Kant, this may follow. But I am not. Hence Kant’s 
argument for radical evil falls stillborn from where I sit.
Kant’s Christology, as mentioned above, has precedence in the Kabbal-
ist notion of Adam Kadmon and other NeoPlatonic versions of Judaism, 
such as Philo of Alexandria’s Heavenly Man.21 I think it is likely that these 
NeoPlatonic versions of Judaism are precisely what sit in the background 
of Kant’s thought, since these were already employed in Kant’s day as a 
way of evangelizing Jews without appeal to the NT or the historical Jesus.22 
However, I think such Christology offers an inadequately low standard of 
divinity. Granting the reading of IDKR, Kant’s prototype is not a second 
divine particular (hypostasis) having the same essence (ousia) as God the 
Father. Rather, the prototype is divine in the same way that any Platonic 
Idea emanating from the mind of God in eternity is divine. It is divine by 
virtue of being in God (6:60, cf. 28:1058–1059). On this reading of Christo-
logical divinity, I cannot see how such a divine-human archetype is any 
different than, say, the divine-canine archetype of a dog that is in God’s 
mind from eternity. Kant could reply that he has no rational basis for be-
lieving that God has an archetypal Idea of dog; he only has a rational basis 
for believing in God’s Idea of our moral prototype. But this only delays the 
issue. If God does have Ideas other than the human prototype, those Ideas 
are just as divine as the Son of God, or to invert it, Kant’s prototype is no 
19E.g. monopsychism was targeted in the Condemnations of 1270. 
20See, e.g., Origen, De principiis, 1.5.3; 1.8.3 (PG 11:158–160; 178–179); Gregory of Nyssa, 
Oratio catechetica magna, 8; 21 (PG 45:33a–40b; 57a–60b); and John of Damascus, De fide or-
thodoxa, 2.27 (PG 94:960b–961a). Patristic citations refer to standardized divisions and their 
locations in Patrologiae cursus completes, ed. J. P. Migne (Paris, 1844–1866).
21Gershom Scholem, On the Kabbalah and Its Symbolism (New York: Schocken, 1965), 159–
165; Philo of Alexandria, Legum allegoriae, I, xii (31); and Samuel Sandmel, Philo’s Place in 
Judaism (New York: Ktav, 1971), xxi, 100.
22Allison P. Coudert, “The Kabbala Denudata: Converting Jews or Seducing Christians,” 
in Jewish Christians and Christian Jews: from the Renaissance to the Enlightenment, ed. Rich-
ard H. Popkin and Gordon M. Weiner (Kluwer Academic Publishers), 79–80; Sarah Hutton, 
Anne Conway: A Woman Philosopher (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 123; 
Sheila A. Spector, “Wonders Divine”: The Development of Blake’s Kabbalistic Myth (Lewisburg, 
PA: Bucknell University Press, 2002), 32; Allison P. Coudert, “Isaac Luria and the Lurianic 
Kabbalah,” in The Columbia History of Western Philosophy, ed. Richard H. Popkin (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1999), 214–215. For Leibniz’s comments on Adam Kadmon, see 
“Leibniz to Maturinus Veyssière la Croze (Berlin, 2 December 1706)” in Opera Omnia, ed. 
Ludovic Dutens, vol. 5, 479–484; “Leibniz to Thomas Burnet, 26 May 1706” in Correspon-
dance de Leibniz ave l’Electrice Sophie de Brunswick-Lunebourg, ed. O. Klopp (London: William 
& Norgate, 1874), vol. 3, 217; Die philosophischen Schriften von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, ed. 
C. I. Gerhardt, 7 vols. (Berlin, 1875–1890), vi, 112–113; Maria Rosa Antognazza, Leibniz on 
the Trinity and the Incarnation: Reason and Revelation in the Seventeenth Century, trans. Gerald 
Parks (Yale University Press, 2008), 140–143.
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more divine than those Ideas. Surely this is not the Christ of Chalcedon or 
of history.
As for Kant’s ecclesiology, it finds practical footing, but this footing 
is far different than that of the one Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church. 
For Kant, the gathering of moral converts is mere utility, providing sup-
port in the battle against moral regress (IDKR, 185–192). The collection of 
converts is ad hoc, built on nothing but a common moral struggle. I under-
stand the Christian Church to be something far different. The Church is 
an organism that is mystically united with Christ as his body. Its existence 
is grounded not in utility, but in the Incarnation. This event marks the 
moment at which the life that is in God the Father—a life given by eternal 
generation to God the Son—descended to humanity, communicating that 
life to our dying species. That life was breathed into the apostles at Pente-
cost, given to the clergy, and is distributed to all who are willing to receive 
it by means of the sacraments. Through this organism, the immortal life 
of God spreads throughout the world and throughout time. The Church 
is not a club whose value resides in group support; its value resides in its 
sacramental power to commune its members with the life-giving flesh 
and blood of Christ, and the life of God found therein.
All of the above points, however, come down to a fundamental differ-
ence between the respective starting points for Kant and me. Kant be-
gins with epistemic strictures that pose serious difficulties for theological 
knowledge and discourse. I believe Kant’s strictures are in many ways 
correct, as is his understanding of the problems these strictures pose. 
In my assessment, the Eastern Church fathers shared these very same 
strictures. The great difference concerns not the limits of human reason 
but the way forward. Kant establishes the limits of human reason; he 
presumes these limits to be stable; and from within these limits he seeks 
a rational theology. Yet, the Church fathers grant the same limits concern-
ing both God and things in themselves.23 Unlike Kant, however, they take 
our faculties to be mutable and susceptible to transfiguration, and such 
metamorphosis is the very promise of the sacramental life and the goal 
of mystical pursuit.24
For my part, I think Kant does a remarkable job of offering arguments 
that press in the direction of a great many truths. But Kant’s arguments, 
23I have in mind here the patristic distinction between ousia and energia, according to 
which the essence of a thing is never accessible to our faculties, since we only ever in-
teract with appearances and operations. See, e.g., Irenaeus, Contra haereses, 4.20.5–11 (PG 
7:1034–1041); Origen, De principiis, 1.1.5–6; 1.1.9 (PG 11:124–126; 129–130); Basil of Caesarea, 
Epistolae, 233.1–2; 234.1–2; 235.1–2 (PG 32:264b–268b; 268b–272b; 872b–873a); and Gregory of 
Nazianzen, Orationes, 27–28 (PG 36:12b–72b).
24See Irenaeus, Contra haereses, 4.20.5–11 (PG 7:1034–1041); Athenagoras, Legatio pro Chris-
tianis, 9 (PG 6:905a–908b); Basil of Caesarea, De Spiritu sancto, 9.23 (PG 32:109a); Epistolae, 236 
(PG 32:876b–885a); and Gregory of Nazianzen, Orationes, 27–28 (PG 36:12b–72b). I argue this 
point in “What Hath Königsberg to Do with Byzantium? An Eastern Reply to the Problem 
of Post-Kantian Theology,” 45th International Congress of Medieval Studies, May  13–16, 2010, 
Kalamazoo, MI.
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in my assessment, distort these truths. The end result is more a testimony 
to the ingenuity of the human mind than a fount of knowledge. To be 
sure, I am not saying that Kant’s arguments should not be considered on 
their own merits. Yet, my assessment is that the results are so distinctly 
Kantian that even if the arguments prove valid, as IDKR argues, they are 
bound to die the death of a thousand qualifications that none other than 
Kant himself would grant.
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